* fix(msteams): add SSRF validation to file consent upload URL
The uploadToConsentUrl() function previously accepted any URL from the
fileConsent/invoke response without validation. A malicious Teams tenant
user could craft an invoke activity with an attacker-controlled uploadUrl,
causing the bot to PUT file data to arbitrary destinations (SSRF).
This commit adds validateConsentUploadUrl() which enforces:
1. HTTPS-only protocol
2. Hostname must match a strict allowlist of Microsoft/SharePoint
domains (sharepoint.com, graph.microsoft.com, onedrive.com, etc.)
3. DNS resolution check rejects private/reserved IPs (RFC 1918,
loopback, link-local) to prevent DNS rebinding attacks
The CONSENT_UPLOAD_HOST_ALLOWLIST is intentionally narrower than the
existing DEFAULT_MEDIA_HOST_ALLOWLIST, excluding overly broad domains
like blob.core.windows.net and trafficmanager.net that any Azure
customer can create endpoints under.
Includes 47 tests covering IPv4/IPv6 private IP detection, protocol
enforcement, hostname allowlist matching, DNS failure handling, and
end-to-end upload validation.
* fix(msteams): validate all DNS answers for consent uploads
* fix(msteams): restore changelog header
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Co-authored-by: Brad Groux <bradgroux@users.noreply.github.com>
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