openclaw/docs/tools/exec-approvals.md

summary, read_when, title

summary	read_when	title
Exec approvals, allowlists, and sandbox escape prompts	Configuring exec approvals or allowlists Implementing exec approval UX in the macOS app Reviewing sandbox escape prompts and implications	Exec approvals

Exec approvals are the companion app / node host guardrail for letting a sandboxed agent run commands on a real host (gateway or node). A safety interlock: commands are allowed only when policy + allowlist + (optional) user approval all agree. Exec approvals stack on top of tool policy and elevated gating (unless elevated is set to full, which skips approvals).

Effective policy is the **stricter** of `tools.exec.*` and approvals defaults; if an approvals field is omitted, the `tools.exec` value is used. Host exec also uses local approvals state on that machine — a host-local `ask: "always"` in `~/.openclaw/exec-approvals.json` keeps prompting even if session or config defaults request `ask: "on-miss"`.

Inspecting the effective policy

• openclaw approvals get, ... --gateway, ... --node <id|name|ip> — show requested policy, host policy sources, and the effective result.
• openclaw exec-policy show — local-machine merged view.
• openclaw exec-policy set|preset — synchronize the local requested policy with the local host approvals file in one step.

When a local scope requests host=node, exec-policy show reports that scope as node-managed at runtime instead of pretending the local approvals file is the source of truth.

If the companion app UI is not available, any request that would normally prompt is resolved by the ask fallback (default: deny).

Native chat approval clients can seed channel-specific affordances on the pending approval message. For example, Matrix seeds reaction shortcuts (`✅` allow once, `❌` deny, `♾️` allow always) while still leaving `/approve ...` commands in the message as a fallback.

Where it applies

Exec approvals are enforced locally on the execution host:

• gateway host → openclaw process on the gateway machine
• node host → node runner (macOS companion app or headless node host)

Trust model note:

• Gateway-authenticated callers are trusted operators for that Gateway.
• Paired nodes extend that trusted operator capability onto the node host.
• Exec approvals reduce accidental execution risk, but are not a per-user auth boundary.
• Approved node-host runs bind canonical execution context: canonical cwd, exact argv, env binding when present, and pinned executable path when applicable.
• For shell scripts and direct interpreter/runtime file invocations, OpenClaw also tries to bind one concrete local file operand. If that bound file changes after approval but before execution, the run is denied instead of executing drifted content.
• This file binding is intentionally best-effort, not a complete semantic model of every interpreter/runtime loader path. If approval mode cannot identify exactly one concrete local file to bind, it refuses to mint an approval-backed run instead of pretending full coverage.

macOS split:

• node host service forwards system.run to the macOS app over local IPC.
• macOS app enforces approvals + executes the command in UI context.

Settings and storage

Approvals live in a local JSON file on the execution host:

~/.openclaw/exec-approvals.json

Example schema:

{
  "version": 1,
  "socket": {
    "path": "~/.openclaw/exec-approvals.sock",
    "token": "base64url-token"
  },
  "defaults": {
    "security": "deny",
    "ask": "on-miss",
    "askFallback": "deny",
    "autoAllowSkills": false
  },
  "agents": {
    "main": {
      "security": "allowlist",
      "ask": "on-miss",
      "askFallback": "deny",
      "autoAllowSkills": true,
      "allowlist": [
        {
          "id": "B0C8C0B3-2C2D-4F8A-9A3C-5A4B3C2D1E0F",
          "pattern": "~/Projects/**/bin/rg",
          "lastUsedAt": 1737150000000,
          "lastUsedCommand": "rg -n TODO",
          "lastResolvedPath": "/Users/user/Projects/.../bin/rg"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}

No-approval "YOLO" mode

If you want host exec to run without approval prompts, you must open both policy layers:

• requested exec policy in OpenClaw config (tools.exec.*)
• host-local approvals policy in ~/.openclaw/exec-approvals.json

This is now the default host behavior unless you tighten it explicitly:

• tools.exec.security: full on gateway/node
• tools.exec.ask: off
• host askFallback: full

Important distinction:

• tools.exec.host=auto chooses where exec runs: sandbox when available, otherwise gateway.
• YOLO chooses how host exec is approved: security=full plus ask=off.
• CLI-backed providers that expose their own noninteractive permission mode can follow this policy. Claude CLI adds --permission-mode bypassPermissions when OpenClaw's requested exec policy is YOLO. Override that backend behavior with explicit Claude args under agents.defaults.cliBackends.claude-cli.args / resumeArgs, for example --permission-mode default, acceptEdits, or bypassPermissions.
• In YOLO mode, OpenClaw does not add a separate heuristic command-obfuscation approval gate or script-preflight rejection layer on top of the configured host exec policy.
• auto does not make gateway routing a free override from a sandboxed session. A per-call host=node request is allowed from auto, and host=gateway is only allowed from auto when no sandbox runtime is active. If you want a stable non-auto default, set tools.exec.host or use /exec host=... explicitly.

If you want a more conservative setup, tighten either layer back to allowlist / on-miss or deny.

Persistent gateway-host "never prompt" setup:

openclaw config set tools.exec.host gateway
openclaw config set tools.exec.security full
openclaw config set tools.exec.ask off
openclaw gateway restart

Then set the host approvals file to match:

openclaw approvals set --stdin <<'EOF'
{
  version: 1,
  defaults: {
    security: "full",
    ask: "off",
    askFallback: "full"
  }
}
EOF

Local shortcut for the same gateway-host policy on the current machine:

openclaw exec-policy preset yolo

That local shortcut updates both:

• local tools.exec.host/security/ask
• local ~/.openclaw/exec-approvals.json defaults

It is intentionally local-only. If you need to change gateway-host or node-host approvals remotely, continue using openclaw approvals set --gateway or openclaw approvals set --node <id|name|ip>.

For a node host, apply the same approvals file on that node instead:

openclaw approvals set --node <id|name|ip> --stdin <<'EOF'
{
  version: 1,
  defaults: {
    security: "full",
    ask: "off",
    askFallback: "full"
  }
}
EOF

Important local-only limitation:

• openclaw exec-policy does not synchronize node approvals
• openclaw exec-policy set --host node is rejected
• node exec approvals are fetched from the node at runtime, so node-targeted updates must use openclaw approvals --node ...

Session-only shortcut:

• /exec security=full ask=off changes only the current session.
• /elevated full is a break-glass shortcut that also skips exec approvals for that session.

If the host approvals file stays stricter than config, the stricter host policy still wins.

Policy knobs

Security (exec.security)

• deny: block all host exec requests.
• allowlist: allow only allowlisted commands.
• full: allow everything (equivalent to elevated).

Ask (exec.ask)

• off: never prompt.
• on-miss: prompt only when allowlist does not match.
• always: prompt on every command.
• allow-always durable trust does not suppress prompts when effective ask mode is always

Ask fallback (askFallback)

If a prompt is required but no UI is reachable, fallback decides:

• deny: block.
• allowlist: allow only if allowlist matches.
• full: allow.

Inline interpreter eval hardening (tools.exec.strictInlineEval)

When tools.exec.strictInlineEval=true, OpenClaw treats inline code-eval forms as approval-only even if the interpreter binary itself is allowlisted.

Examples:

• python -c
• node -e, node --eval, node -p
• ruby -e
• perl -e, perl -E
• php -r
• lua -e
• osascript -e

This is defense-in-depth for interpreter loaders that do not map cleanly to one stable file operand. In strict mode:

• these commands still need explicit approval;
• allow-always does not persist new allowlist entries for them automatically.

Allowlist (per agent)

Allowlists are per agent. If multiple agents exist, switch which agent you’re editing in the macOS app. Patterns are glob matches. Patterns can be resolved binary path globs or bare command-name globs. Bare names match only commands invoked through PATH, so rg can match /opt/homebrew/bin/rg when the command is rg, but not ./rg or /tmp/rg. Use a path glob when you want to trust one specific binary location. Legacy agents.default entries are migrated to agents.main on load. Shell chains such as echo ok && pwd still need every top-level segment to satisfy allowlist rules.

Examples:

• rg
• ~/Projects/**/bin/peekaboo
• ~/.local/bin/*
• /opt/homebrew/bin/rg

Each allowlist entry tracks:

• id stable UUID used for UI identity (optional)
• last used timestamp
• last used command
• last resolved path

Auto-allow skill CLIs

When Auto-allow skill CLIs is enabled, executables referenced by known skills are treated as allowlisted on nodes (macOS node or headless node host). This uses skills.bins over the Gateway RPC to fetch the skill bin list. Disable this if you want strict manual allowlists.

Important trust notes:

• This is an implicit convenience allowlist, separate from manual path allowlist entries.
• It is intended for trusted operator environments where Gateway and node are in the same trust boundary.
• If you require strict explicit trust, keep autoAllowSkills: false and use manual path allowlist entries only.

Safe bins and approval forwarding

For safe bins (the stdin-only fast-path), interpreter binding details, and how to forward approval prompts to Slack/Discord/Telegram (or run them as native approval clients), see Exec approvals — advanced.

Control UI editing

Use the Control UI → Nodes → Exec approvals card to edit defaults, per‑agent overrides, and allowlists. Pick a scope (Defaults or an agent), tweak the policy, add/remove allowlist patterns, then Save. The UI shows last used metadata per pattern so you can keep the list tidy.

The target selector chooses Gateway (local approvals) or a Node. Nodes must advertise system.execApprovals.get/set (macOS app or headless node host). If a node does not advertise exec approvals yet, edit its local ~/.openclaw/exec-approvals.json directly.

CLI: openclaw approvals supports gateway or node editing (see Approvals CLI).

Approval flow

When a prompt is required, the gateway broadcasts exec.approval.requested to operator clients. The Control UI and macOS app resolve it via exec.approval.resolve, then the gateway forwards the approved request to the node host.

For host=node, approval requests include a canonical systemRunPlan payload. The gateway uses that plan as the authoritative command/cwd/session context when forwarding approved system.run requests.

That matters for async approval latency:

• the node exec path prepares one canonical plan up front
• the approval record stores that plan and its binding metadata
• once approved, the final forwarded system.run call reuses the stored plan instead of trusting later caller edits
• if the caller changes command, rawCommand, cwd, agentId, or sessionKey after the approval request was created, the gateway rejects the forwarded run as an approval mismatch

System events

Exec lifecycle is surfaced as system messages:

• Exec running (only if the command exceeds the running notice threshold)
• Exec finished
• Exec denied

These are posted to the agent’s session after the node reports the event. Gateway-host exec approvals emit the same lifecycle events when the command finishes (and optionally when running longer than the threshold). Approval-gated execs reuse the approval id as the runId in these messages for easy correlation.

Denied approval behavior

When an async exec approval is denied, OpenClaw prevents the agent from reusing output from any earlier run of the same command in the session. The denial reason is passed with explicit guidance that no command output is available, which stops the agent from claiming there is new output or repeating the denied command with stale results from a prior successful run.

Implications

• full is powerful; prefer allowlists when possible.
• ask keeps you in the loop while still allowing fast approvals.
• Per-agent allowlists prevent one agent's approvals from leaking into others.
• Approvals only apply to host exec requests from authorized senders. Unauthorized senders cannot issue /exec.
• /exec security=full is a session-level convenience for authorized operators and skips approvals by design. To hard-block host exec, set approvals security to deny or deny the exec tool via tool policy.

Related

Safe bins, interpreter binding, and approval forwarding to chat. Shell command execution tool. Break-glass path that also skips approvals. Sandbox modes and workspace access. Security model and hardening. When to reach for each control. Skill-backed auto-allow behavior.